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Abstract 
The aim of this investigation is to determine if there is a relation between 
automation and unemployment within the Italian socio-economic system. 
Italy is Europe’s second nation and the fourth in the world in terms of robot 
density, and among the G7 it is the nation with the highest rate of youth 
unemployment. Establishing the ultimate causes of unemployment is a very 
difficult task, and the notion itself of ‘technological unemployment’ is 
controversial. Mainstream economics tends to relate the high rate of 
unemployment that characterises Italian society with the low flexibility of the 
labour market and the high cost of manpower. Little attention is paid to the 
impact of artificial intelligence on the level of employment. With reference to 
statistical data, we will try to show that automation can be seen at least as a 
contributory cause of unemployment. In addition, we will argue that both 
Luddism and anti-Luddism are two faces of the same coin. In both cases 
attention is focused on technology itself (the means of production) instead of 
on the system (the mode of production). Banning robots or denying the 
problems of robotisation are not effective solutions. A better approach would 
consist in combining growing automation with a more rational redistribution 
of income. 
 
1. Artificial Intelligence and Industrial Automation 
The concept of ‘artificial intelligence’ is a vast one which includes all the forms of thinking 
produced by artificial machines. The concept of AI is therefore strongly related to that of 
automation, that is, of machines behaving autonomously, albeit in response to certain inputs 
and in the presence of programs. Any inorganic machine conceived and construed by humans 
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– be they desktop computers or semi-mobile robots, dishwashers or power looms – and able 
to carry out the tasks that humans carry out using their own intelligence is an automaton. In 
other words, «a certain category of sets of elements are ‘universal’ in the sense that one can 
assemble such elements into machines with which one can realize functions which are 
arbitrary to within certain reasonable restrictions» (Minsky 1956). Given this definition, it 
follows that all functioning automata are endowed with a certain degree of artificial 
intelligence. The refrigerator is less intelligent than a PC, in more or less the same way as an 
insect is less intelligent than a vertebrate. And some do not hesitate to compare the various 
forms of organic and inorganic intelligence (Moravec 1997). 
Automation is therefore not something new that has arisen in the last few years, but the fruit 
of a long and slow historical process that can be taken back to the mechanical calculators of 
Charles Babbage or Blaise Pascal, if not all the way to Heron’s automata. Therefore whoever 
has a more revolutionary conception of artificial intelligence feels the need to introduce a 
distinction between weak AI and strong AI – a distinction that has a philosophical dimension 
and touches on matters such as the functioning of the brain and the ontology of the mind. This 
however will not be the topic of our article. Rather our intention here is to tackle the 
sociological aspects of artificial intelligence – whether it is understood as weak or strong, 
discrete or gradualistic. In other words, we intend to analyse the social, political and 
economical consequences of the production and use of automata or thinking machines. Let us 
just set some temporal and spatial limits to our analysis. We will be looking at the artificial 
intelligence of the third industrial revolution (Campa 2007), which can be situated in the last 
decades of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st. In this period, automation is 
identified in particular with computerisation and robotisation. And we will chiefly be looking 
at Italy, which can in any case be viewed as exemplary, given that it is still among the first 
seven industrial powers of the planet and is one of the leading countries in the world for 
‘robot density.’ 
One of the most systematic applications of electronic calculators and of robots has so far been 
found in industrial plants. Microprocessors are omnipresent. Personal computers are found in 
every home and in every office. There is no institution that does not entrust some of its task to 
AI in some form or other. However, it is in the manufacturing industry that one observes 
some macroscopic social effects of the emergence of this technology. 
We have all seen at least once robots that paint, weld and assemble cars, as well as electronic 
products such as radios, TVs and computers. These are the so-called industrial robots, which 
in advanced technological societies have come to work alongside and, in many cases, replace 
the worker on the assembly line. The first industrial robots appeared in the fifties, but it is 
only in the seventies that their presence in Italian plants began to become significant. They 
were steel constructions of impressive dimensions, endowed with a rudimentary electronic 
brain, faculties of perception, servomechanisms and hydraulic engines. The first generation 
industrial robots were slow and not particularly intelligent, and therefore their work was 
limited to tasks that do not require a high precision, like paint spraying and car body welding. 
Precision work was still done by humans. However, as could be foreseen, the situation 
changed quickly and in the eighties one could see robots able to assemble complex electronic 
circuits, inserting and welding the devices in a matter of seconds and without errors.  
Industrial robots become ever more anthropomorphic. Their degree of freedom1 increases 
their precision, velocity and load capacity. In the car and heavy industry they have little by 
little taken over other tasks that require precision such as piercing, grinding, milling, cutting, 
but also palletisation and stockpiling. Nowadays they are endowed with laser devices and 
visual systems that allow them to operate with millimetric precision. 
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If it is the United States, as producers of the largest number of robots, that show the way, 
Japan also makes a massive entry into the sector from the seventies and onwards. Indeed, 
among the characteristic aspects of the third industrial revolution there is also the 
reorganisation of the processes of production, with the computerisation and automation of the 
entire factory, with Toyota as the true pioneer. It is not by chance that one tends to oppose 
Toyota’s model to the model of organisation based on the assembly line developed by Ford 
and Taylor. According to Cristiano Martorella (2002) “thus the Japanese industrial revolution 
has transformed the factory into an information system and has freed man from mechanical 
work, transforming him into a supervisor of productive processes. This takes place in a period 
in history that sees the transition from the industrial society to the post-industrial society. This 
epochal turning point will be well understood once the transition to the society of services and 
information will be complete.” 
Italy contributes as well. FIAT is the first Italian company to make massive use of industrial 
robots. In general this country tends to import digital electronics from abroad, having lost 
foothold in this field, particularly after the crash of Olivetti in 1997. However, in robotics one 
sees very interesting exceptions to this rule. For example Robogate2 is an Italian invention 
that has since been adopted by the entire car industry. 
We will not enter into technical detail that the reader may find in handbooks (Kurfess 2012, 
Siciliano and Khatib 2008). Rather let us cast a rapid glance at the magnitude of the process 
of robotisation in the industry. As the Italian newspaper La Repubblica stresses, “first 
generation robots, those that work in the industry all over the planet, number over a million: 
350,000 in Japan alone, 326,000 in Europe. In Italy, for every 10,000 persons employed in the 
industry, there are over 100 robots, a number that makes our nation one of the first in the 
world in this sector. They are used above all for mechanical work, in welding and in working 
with plastics. And their price continues to fall: a robot purchased in 2007 may cost a quarter 
of the price of the same robot sold in 1990. And if its yearly cost was 100 in 1990, today it is 
not above 25” (Bignami 2007). 
More precisely, Italy is the second country in Europe and the fourth in the world regarding 
robot density, as shown by a more accurate study by the UNECE (2004, 2005). There are 
already more than 50000 units and the number continues to increase. 
 
2. Effects on the level of employment 
Thanks to censuses from the ISTAT, we are able to make very accurate comparisons between 
the growth of automation on the one hand, and the effects on employment on the other. If one 
leaves aside the census of the factories of the Kingdom of Italy that goes back to 1911, 
ISTAT has done nine censuses relative to industry, commerce and services (1927, 1937-39, 
1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011). The first data of the 9th census (2011) were 
presented on 11th July 2013. It is not always easy to directly compare the statistics because 
with time the techniques of survey and the categories under scrutiny have changed: until 1971 
the focus was ‘industry and commerce’, while from 1981 it is on ‘industry and services.’ 
Statistical series have been ‘harmonised’ however, enabling an overall reading of the data. In 
addition, we are interested now in the manufacturing industry and consequently shifting the 
focus from commerce to services is of marginal relevance. Let us begin nonetheless with a 
comparison between the last three complete series of statistics (1981, 1991, 2001) that are 




TABLE 1 - COMPANIES AND WORKERS BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY – 1981, 
1991, 2001 
 1981 1991 2001 
Economic activity Companies Workers Companies Workers Companies Workers 
Agriculture and 
fishing (a) 
30.215 110.195 31.408 96.759 34.316 98.934 
Extractive 
industry 
4.477 56.791 3.617 46.360 3.837 36.164 
Manufacturing 
industry 
591.014 5.862.347 552.334 5.262.555 542.876 4.894.796 
Energy, gas and 
water 
1.398 42.878 1.273 172.339 1.983 128.287 
Construction 290.105 1.193.356 332.995 1.337.725 515.777 1.529.146 
Commerce and 
repair 
1.282.844 3.053.706 1.280.044 3.250.564 1.230.731 3.147.776 
Hotel and civil 
services 
212.858 644.223 217.628 725.481 244.540 850.674 
Transport and 
communication 
132.164 679.386 124.768 1.131.915 157.390 1.198.824 
Credit and 
insurance 
27.775 446.745 49.897 573.270 81.870 590.267 
Other services 274.463 911.560 706.294 1.977.334 1.270.646 3.238.040 
TOTAL 2.847.313 13.001.187 3.300.258 14.574.302 4.083.966 15.712.908 
 
Although the number of workers as a whole grew over the twenty-year period 1981-2001, it is 
also evident that the number of employees in the manufacturing industry has remarkably 
decreased. The data are significant given that in the meantime the Italian population grew as a 
whole, albeit not at the pace of earlier decades. We can extrapolate backwards the area of 
investigation to uncover that until 1981 the number of people employed by the industry 
increased instead. A study by Margherita Russo and Elena Pirani (2006) that spans the half-
century is useful. The tables, conveniently reconstructed and harmonised, show first the 




TABLE 2 - DYNAMICS OF WORKERS IN ITALY BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 
1951-2001 (ABSOLUTE VALUES) 
 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
 
Engineering 1.041.962 1.569.306 2.166.813 2.745.513 2.531.295 2.496.658 
 
The rest of 
manufacturing 
2.456.258 2.928.698 3.141.774 3.397.865 3.253.313 2.766.994 
 









3.498.220 4.498.004 5.308.587 6.143.378 5.784.608 5.263.652 
 
One could therefore think that – given the fall in the number of companies and workers 
during the twenty-year period from 1981 to 2001 – we have entered into a phase of 
deindustrialisation. This is partly true (Gallino 2003), but the data relative to industrial output 
show that the fall in number of workers does not correspond to a fall in output. See on this 
matter the study by Menghini and Travaglia (2006) on the evolution of Italian industry, where 
the tables relative to the decade 1981-1991 (the eighties) and 1991-2001 (the nineties) show a 
noticeable increase in industrial output. 
Intermediary surveys during the decade 2001-2011 are less ‘linear’ because of the two big 
epochal events that have characterised the 2000s: a) the terrorist attack on the USA and 
ensuing war in the Middle East; b) the major economic crisis that began in 2008 and is still 
with us. ISTAT data shows that in the 2008-2010 period, the slump in employment becomes 
much more pronounced, while industrial output also decreases. This happens in Italy as in 
other Western nations. However, the first data of the 9th census on industry and services 
(ISTAT 2011) confirm the trend of a decreasing number of industrial employees coupled with 
the growth of the total number of workers.  
 
TABLE 3 - COMPARISON OF THE DYNAMICS OF WORKERS IN 
MANUFACTURING WITH TOTAL WORKERS, 2001-2011 
Type of data Number of active enterprises Number of workers  
Anno 2001 2011 2001 2011 
Total 4083966 4425950 15712908 16424086 
Manufacturing industry 527155 422067 4810674 3891983 




In ten years, the number of blue-collar workers has decreased by approximately one million 
units. The following specific data are also quite significant: 
  
TABLE 4 - DYNAMICS OF WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING AND REPAIR OF 
COMPUTERS AND MACHINERY, 2001-2011 
Type of data Number of active enterprises Number of workers 
Anno 2001 2011 2001 2011 
Manufacturing of computer and other 
electronic devices   5434 5693 139239 112055 
Manufacturing of machinery and 
other equipment   21263 24584 451806 457956 
Repair of computer and other 
domestic appliances   33659 26152 61512 46837 
 
Here, we can clearly see that workers expelled from other manufacturing industries are not 
reabsorbed into the computing and machinery sectors. The number of enterprises active in the 
manufacturing of computers grew, while the number of workers in the same sector 
significantly shrank. We also notice a decrease of both enterprises and workers involved in 
computer repair. The only exception is the manufacturing of machinery, where we observe 
that the number of both enterprises and workers grow. But a growth of 6,150 workers 
compared with the loss of one million jobs can hardly be seen as evidence that workers made 
redundant by machineries are ‘recycled’ by the system as machinery constructors. 
Summing up, notwithstanding turbulences connected to wars and financial crises, we can say 
that on the whole, during the last thirty years, a trend has emerged that is characterised by a 
fall in the number of industrial workers and an increase in industrial output. This should not 
astonish if one keeps in mind that productivity depends also on other factors. The other factor 
that grows noticeably during this same period is precisely automation, that is, the massive use 
of computers and robots in industrial manufacturing. 
All this therefore leads one to think that there exists a relation between the fall of employment 
in industry and the growth of automation. This is the hypothesis we want to consider. 
Allow us to open a bracket. It is known that data are not only read but also interpreted. A 
statistical correlation does not imply a causal dependence between the phenomena. Therefore 
the statistical data could just be a starting point, to which will later be added other elements, 
other considerations. But without statistics one goes nowhere. To those who say that statistics 
are unreliable and that one can therefore easily do without them, we reply with a well known 
popular diction: if money does not buy happiness, imagine misery. By analogy we say: if 
statistics do not give certainty, imagine mere impressions. Close brackets. 
To start, we take into account the interpretation of Luciano Gallino, perhaps the greatest 
expert on the sociology of work and industry in Italy. We are trying to shed light first of all on 
the question of ‘technological unemployment’: 
Technology is essentially a means to do two different things. On the one hand 
one may try to produce more, even much more, using the same amount of 
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work. On the other hand one can try to use the potentiality of technology to 
reduce the workforce employed to produce a given volume of goods or 
services. And this leads to a very simple equation: as long as one manages to 
increase production, which means that as long as one manages to increase the 
markets, technology does not generate any unemployment because the work 
force remains constant and the only thing that grows are the markets. The 
markets however, different the one from the other, varied as they are, in 
general cannot expand forever. When the markets can no longer expand, 
technology is used mainly to reduce the workforce and then the spectre of 
technological unemployment begins to loom (Gallino 1999). 
 
Economists tend to underestimate the problem of technological unemployment because one 
observes that, in percent, the unemployment due to the technological development of the last 
two hundred years has not been unsustainable. In general one avoids the issue saying that 
every new technology eliminates one job while creating another. Even if the computer takes 
an employee’s job, there will be the need to build and maintain computers. There is a grain of 
truth in this observation, but the issue is slightly more complex. This allegation always wafts 
the idea of the invisible hand, of the self-regulating market. In reality the system has so far 
had to thank the constant intervention of governments with policies of all kinds. The 
readjustment of the economic system, following the introduction of new and revolutionary 
technologies, does not happen in real time and without a price. If it is true that the worker or 
the employee that the machine has replaced can find another job, perhaps a new kind of job, it 
is also true that they might not have the skills required for the new job (for example: computer 
maintenance) and that, in order to acquire them they will need months and perhaps years – 
that is, if they are successful. Therefore the replacement work can arise one or two years after 
the work was lost. Humans are fragile machines – they do not survive more than a few days in 
the absence of a certain amount of calories, adequate clothing and a roof over their head. At 
the same time, these ‘machines’ tend to behave violently and disruptively if they come face to 
face with the prospect of their own destruction. Therefore even if it is the case that the market 
self-regulates, since it does not do so immediately, if one wants to avoid the instantaneous 
collateral effects of technological unemployment, one will have to play the public hand in 
addition to the invisible one.  
This is what all governments have been doing, even those most liberal and capitalist. For over 
a century, governments have systematically obliged employers to reduce working hours, in 
order to compel them – against their interest – to maintain the number of employees3. They 
have instituted tools such as unemployment benefits or national insurance contributions, at 
times efficiently, at others creating pockets of parasitism. They have acquired the goods 
produced by the private sector via public contracts. They have funded retraining schemes and 
refresher courses for the chronically unemployed. And in the most tragic cases they have 
patched up the effects of economic crises by starting wars. On the one hand conflicts reduce 
the population by sending entire generations to the front and on the other hand they allow the 
war industry to reabsorb the jobless. However cynical this may seem, it has happened and it 
continues to happen. 
These tools, especially the systematic reduction of working hours and benefits to the 
temporarily unemployed, have so far worked rather well. Today the appearance of two new 
factors – globalisation and artificial intelligence – has created a new situation with respect to 
the one generated by the first and the second industrial revolution. Globalisation no longer 
allows one to operate on the basis of reduced working hours. To do so would be suicidal if not 
implemented at a global level and adopted by all nations. Although globalisation has created a 
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single large market it has not created a single large society led by a government that is its 
authentic expression. There probably exists a kind of ‘shadow world government’, otherwise 
one cannot understand for whom or for what the national states are giving up their own 
sovereignty, but – if there is such a thing – it resembles a financial oligarchy that 
understandably defends its own interests, rather than an enlightened elite serving the interests 
of all. The idea that there could exist a market without a society has, as we can see, critical 
consequences. 
In addition there is the matter of artificial intelligence. The idea that every job eliminated by a 
technology is sooner or later replaced by a job generated by that same technology is called 
into question by the nature of automation itself. Gallino (1999) writes: “This minor textbook 
equation prevails much less at the age of driven automation, the one that I call ‘recursive 
automation.’ The jobs that technology used to create soon after it had suppressed a certain 
number were partly recovered by the enlargement of the markets but partly also by producing 
technological means, that is, producing the same machines of goods and services that the 
markets absorbed up to a point. With automation applied to itself the machines produce other 
machines to automate, the process of automation attains very high levels and thus there is no 
longer any hope, or at least it is much reduced, to sooner or later find a new job in the sectors 
that produce the technology that eliminated the original job, the first job.” 
All empirical evidence shows that technological unemployment is more than a hypothesis. It 
is on the basis of data and graphs, and certainly not of moral principles, that sociologists 
criticise mainstream economics. Although it is dated, the book Se tre millioni vi sembrano 
pochi
4 is still instructive; in this analysis Gallino (1998) gives a central position to recursive 
automation, which until then had been given little heed. In the following review, sociologist 
Patrizio Di Nicola sums up the main ideas: 
 
- To the myth that the upswing generates employment the author opposes Italian 
statistical evidence: in thirty years GNP has doubled, but the number of workers has 
only increased by 2,1%, that is of 400 000 units. But at the same time the number of 
resident citizens has increased by over 6 million; 
 
- The idea that technology creates, long term, more jobs than it destroys was valid in 
the past, the author states, but is no longer so. The increase in productivity due to 
new machines can generate a positive occupational balance only if the markets 
absorb more merchandise. But in Italy companies function inside mature and partly 
static markets and export in these sectors is anything but easy; 
 
- The advice to do ‘like the Americans,’ who seemed to have managed to create a 
phenomenal job machine, is founded on misleading presuppositions. In fact, on the 
one hand, the increase in the number of jobs is a direct consequence of the increase 
in the population (which between 1980 and 1995 went from 227,8 to 263,4 million 
units). On the other hand American job performance is aided by a somewhat relaxed 
statistical method. Count as employed the following: 6 million students aged 16-24, 
who nevertheless have been working for at least one hour in the week preceding the 
survey (maybe washed the neighbour’s car or delivered the newspaper before going 
to college); 20 million contingent workers, people who work sporadically, when 
they can; 23 million part-time workers, who in reality correspond to 12 million 
fulltime jobs. And in the same way as they overestimate the number of employed – 
Gallino observes – the official statistics made in the USA underestimate the number 
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of unemployed that, applying European criteria, ought to be over 12% instead of 
5,3%. That is a little over the European mean. 
 
- To the idea that what is most responsible for the poor levels of employment is the 
welfare state Gallino objects with some ‘odd cases’: Italy, with its 12,2% 
unemployed, spends 25,1% of GNP on welfare, while Holland, which has an 
unemployment rate of 6,5% spends the most: 29,8%. Denmark, the country where 
unemployment is the lowest in Europe, allocates 32,7% of GNP to social welfare. At 
the other extreme Spain, which invests less than we [Italy] in welfare, has a level of 
unemployment that is above 22%. 
 
In brief, the growth of production and of productivity has not necessarily brought about the 
growth of employment. The relation between growth and employment is extremely weak in a 
country that does not produce technologies but imports them at best
5
. The American model is 
an illusion because the occupational data are ‘inflated’ (and, ten years after the publication of 
this book, the situation is even worse after the outbreak of the financial crisis). Welfare – 
considering the graphs – rather than being an obstacle to growth appears to be a factor of 
production, but almost all Western countries tend to respond to the crisis by dismantling or 
reducing social benefits. 
Not only that. One cannot even hope that someone who is expelled from industry will later 
necessarily be reabsorbed by the service sector (be it public or private), “because services are 
just as much susceptible to automation as the production of goods” (Bignami 2007). We will 
consider this aspect in greater detail. 
 
3.  Social stratification and the new generation robot 
Automation is already expanding beyond the manufacturing industry. The evolution of robots 
now has its effects also on the tertiary sector. In addition the presence of robots within the 
home is growing at the rate of 7-8% per year. According to the predictions of Bruno Siciliano, 
president of the International Society of Robotics and Automation, “out of the 66 billion 
dollars that will represent the cost of robotics in 2025, 35% will be that of personal and 
service robots” (Bignami 2007). This is why, if we have failed in the past to correctly 
formulate the social problem of robotisation, it would be even more shortsighted not to 
formulate it now. “So from now on robots are everywhere. In our home, in the office, in our 
car. They take care of the elderly: South Korea has developed robots that control home 
electric appliances and remind the elder person when it is time to take his medicine. They 
serve as nurses to the sick (in the USA some prototypes are even taking their temperature) 
and they can also transform into tail-wagging puppies (the case of ‘Aibo’ among others); soon 
they will act as baby-sitters if it is true that some companies are researching how to ‘teach’ 
the automaton to rock a newborn.” 
Philosophers and scientists talk about all this, once in a while, in symposiums and 
conferences, but the question seems virtually absent from political agendas. The problem is 
underestimated for two main reasons: 1) the lobbying power of major industries, that only 
stand to benefit from robotisation, and therefore feel no necessity to discuss the issue in wider 
terms, and 2) the widespread conviction that robots will never be able to imitate humans all 
the way. Yet, as Siciliano observes, today there are robots capable of doing the same work as 
a craftsman. “They are working in the zone between Vietri and Cava dei Tirreni where they 
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are imitating the master potters.” In practice the robot is not just able to imitate the assembly 
line production and surpass it in precision, but also that human imprecision of the craftsmen 
that is so characteristic of their product. An optical system records the craftsman’s imprecise 
brush strokes, all different from one another. Using this information one writes a program 
which, when implemented in the robot, enables it to produce tiles that are all different from 
one another. 
If we proceed in this way, robots could replace humans also for activities involving decision-
making. Interviewed by Bignami (2007), Antonio Monopoli makes this forecast: “It is likely 
that with time one will produce robots with greater and greater ability to teach themselves. In 
fact we will have robots able to ‘decide’, a condition they share with humans.” Once we have 
got that far, according to Bignami, “the expansion of robotics will also involve problems of 
ethics, and it is not fortuitous that one talks of ‘Roboethics’ at the ICRA conference. One 
problem that may arise is the possible inadequacy of the robot’s response to events. In the 
case of injury, who would be responsible?” Monopoli replies that: “If the robot is regarded as 
a machine, the responsibility falls on the owner. But if the robot has a great capacity for self-
learning and interaction with the external world, and the idea of robots working autonomously 
is socially accepted, one could not question the good intention of those who designed and 
commercialised the robot.” 
These problems are generally presented as having to do with roboethics, and therefore as 
ethical problems (that concern the whole of humanity and have to be solved with reference to 
universal principles) and not as chiefly political (that is, that concern the interests of a polis, a 
community, a faction, a social group). Now we should wish to stress that the problem – be it 
ethical or political – was born before, when the big industrial robots arrived to the factories. 
The robots’ spread from the factories into homes and offices is if anything part of an 
evolution of the old problem that arose already with the industrial revolution. The ruling 
classes downgraded the problem of technological unemployment into a ‘technical’ one and 
certainly not ‘ethical’, as long as the victim of the process was the working class. It would be 
interesting if the same ruling classes were outraged should an anthropomorphic robot sit down 
at the desk of the CEO or an AI replace the manager in the control room of a multi-national. 
If he were alive, Karl Marx would probably say that that the bourgeoisie wakes up to the 
ethical problem once the robot reveals itself able to replace also the manager, the artisan, the 
medical doctor, the teacher, when it acquires the ability to make decisions – and not only the 
proletarian at the assembly line. Again, the dominant group equates itself with humanity and 
turns its own political problem, its own class interests, into a universal ethical problem. 
 
4. The need for a new socio-industrial policy 
With the exception of radical ecologists and the supporters of degrowth, most people - 
regardless of which side of the political spectrum they are on – would claim that economic 
growth and a high rate of employment are good things. These are universally seen as goals 
that should be pursued. Let us therefore ask ourselves if the policies that the last several 
Italian governments have implemented are effectively rational – that is, do they allow these 
goals to be achieved. Current Italian political leadership seems to assume that growth and 
employment have no causal link with automation, given that this factor is repeatedly forgotten 
in analyses. Basically, politicians accept the thesis of the “Luddite fallacy” elaborated by 
economists. 
Therefore, most policies have the aim of making the labour market more flexible or reducing 
the cost of labour. It is assumed that Italy would attract more investments, if it were easier for 
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capitalists to fire workers and if workers were less ‘choosy’ when looking for a job. The 
policies based on these assumptions tend to create a favourable ground for brain drain and the 
immigration of unskilled workers. A mass of immigrants with reduced rights (given that they 
cannot vote and have temporary resident permits) is much more appealing to companies than 
skilled and demanding citizens. 
Has this approach, adopted systematically since the early 1990s, produced positive results? 
Everything points to the contrary. As a matter of fact, the deregulation of the labour market 
and the gradual dismantling of the welfare state have not generated the expected results. Data 
from the World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund (October 
2012) show that, in the decade 2003-2013, Italy’s growth has on the whole been -0.1%. This 
means that while the global economy keeps growing, Italy occupies one of the few positions 
with negative growth, together with Zimbabwe, San Marino, Greece, and Portugal (Pasquali, 
Ventura and Aridas 2013). 
These policies could be ineffective and, perhaps, even counterproductive exactly because the 
last generation of robots and computers have something to do with structural unemployment. 
On the one hand, highly automated industries, having not so many humans in the loop, are 
probably much more preoccupied about the cost of energy than the cost of labour. On the 
other hand, no matter how much the cost of labour and the rights of workers in a developed 
country can be reduced, low-tech industries will always find it more convenient to relocate to 
underdeveloped countries. 
In other words, the very problem could be the postulate on which the system is built: its 
necessity – that is, the idea of the invariance of the mode of production. Hence, the solution to 
almost any contingent problem is primarily to patch it up (at low cost) to keep the system up 
and running for now – leaving the serious problems for future generations to sort out. 
This is pretty obvious in the case of the politics of development and of social security 
policies. For decades Italian political leaders spoken of the necessity to stimulate scientific 
research, but talk remains always and only talk. In reality investment in research, both from 
the State and from private sources, is at its lowest6. Hence, it so happens that Italy – a nation 
belonging to the leading group of developed economies (of the G7 or G8) – has no 
manufacturers of computers or of mobile phones – to state two driving products of the new 
economical phase. The result is that technological development is certainly not slowing down, 
given that technology can also be imported. Rather the result is that one does not stimulate the 
sector that could reabsorb at least part of the technological unemployment. 
As regards the politics of prevention, a now creaking system has been in place for a few 
decades, and it relies on two remedies: a massive immigration from the less developed 
countries and an increased age of retirement. The first remedy presupposes that there is an 
oversupply of jobs in Italy, while the second one shrinks the job market for the young – so 
this policy appears schizophrenic right from the start. Yet this policy is in fact the fruit of a 
plan that the Ministry of Work and Social Policies, under the leadership of Maurizio Sacconi, 
has put in black and white. If we read a document by the Directorate-General dated February 
23rd 2011 with the title “Immigration for work in Italy” we discover that the Italian 
government feels the need to increase the number of immigrants: “In the period 2011-2015 
the mean yearly requirement should lie around 100,000 while in the period 2016-2020 it 
should reach 260,000” (Polchi 2011). So in the next few years we will need to ‘import’ one 
million eight hundred thousand workers who would be added to the four million already 
residing in Italy (data from ISTAT)7. The conclusion that we will need six million immigrant 
workers in the next ten years derives from the following analysis: “The need for manpower is 
linked at once to job demand and job supply. On the side of supply one foresees that between 
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2010 and 2020 a decrease in the working population (employed plus unemployed) of 5,5% 
and 7,9%: from 24 million 970 thousand in 2010 it would fall to a value comprised between 
about 23 million 593 thousand and 23 million in 2020. On the side of demand the number 
employed would grow for a decade at a rate between 0,2% and 0.9%, reaching in 2020 23 
million 257 thousand in the first case and 24 million 902 thousand in the second” (Polchi 
2011). 
Where is the error? For a start, one has not at all taken into account that we are not yet out of 
the crisis and that too many Italian companies, when they have not relocated, are closing 
down8. Among other things, now also ‘historic’ companies like FIAT threaten to relocate 
their production abroad. All this while brains are drained. And there is more. If what we have 
seen about automation is true, the calculation error is macroscopic. One cannot appraise 
employment on the basis of a presumed increase in production which, among other things, 
does not include a possible increase in productivity due to automation. Is it too much to ask of 
the Ministry of Work that they know what artificial intelligence is? If nurses and bricklayers 
will also be replaced by robots, what will then become of the six million immigrants that no 
one has really tried to integrate, but that have instead been regarded as stop-gaps to keep 
pension payments ticking over? What will six million people do – with different languages, 
religions and customs – when they have no home and no work, and, since they are not even 
citizens, will have no political rights and not be eligible for many kinds of social benefits? 
Has anyone ever asked if among these six million there is an even ratio of men and women 
(the required minimum to favour integration)? Has anyone ever asked what skills they have? 
If they can be given the jobs of the future? And how they feel about Italians? About 
Europeans? 
Of course, one cannot blame only the centre-right government for this shortsighted policy, 
given that it is a bipartisan vision, where in fact some left-wingers would turn a blind eye to 
illegal immigration – and therefore not include them in the census nor ever attempt to plug the 
leak of the ‘Italian system.’ Even the Catholics gloat at the government’s document. Andrea 
Olivero, the national president of the ACLI, the Christian Association of Italian Workers, 
hurried to say that, “these data will expose the demagogy of those who go on about the threat 
of immigrants. Without them the nation would implode, and to welcome them civilly is not 
just a humanitarian act but also an intelligent strategy for the future (…). While the last few 
years have been dominated by an obtuse logic of containment that however has failed, we are 
happy that the Ministry of Work now looks realistically at the data because only then will it 
finally be possible to direct the government to the phenomenon of immigration that until now 
has been unsuccessful” (Polchi 2011). 
A wise strategy for the future? Not at all, if the scenario analysis elaborated by futurist Hans 
Moravec in “The Age of Robots” (1993) is at least partly correct. According to him, in the 
first half of the 21st century “inexpensive but capable robots will displace human labor so 
broadly that the average workday would have to plummet to practically zero to keep everyone 
usefully employed.” But since the possibility of reducing working hours is not even 
discussed, what we can expect is growing unemployment, or the growing precariousness of 
the labour market, or the creation of pointless jobs. Yet without going too far, it would be 
enough to familiarise oneself with Moore’s Law, the rate of development of artificial 
intelligence, the prospect of robotics and nanotechnology, in order to understand that not 
many hands and perhaps even not many brains will be needed to maintain or augment the 
level of production. 
The ‘rough guess’ planning by the Italian government leaves one therefore somewhat 
perplexed. If this is the vision of the future of the ruling class, then we should probably expect 
a gloomy scenario. The possible consequence of an underestimation of the new automation 
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process could be “widespread immiseration, economic contraction and polarization between 
the wealthy, the shrinking working class and the structurally redundant” (Hughes 2004). 
Actually something even worse may happen. It is unlikely that we will witness the peaceful 
extinction by starvation of humans replaced by AI in the production process. Before this takes 
place a revolt will break out. And perhaps this would even come as a surprise to some. Also 
Gallino (1999) states that we will have to expect social tensions. When asked if he foresees 
conflicts in the future he replies: 
Yes of course, even if these conflicts will be of various kinds. In the 
meantime the conflict we have now is due to growing inequalities. In all the 
industrial nations, including our own (and ours even to a lesser extent that the 
others) the technological development of the last 20 or 30 years has meant a 
high increase in inequality between the fifth that earns least and the fifth that 
earns most from their work. If you then consider the smallest percentages, the 
differences are even larger, above all in the United States, but also in nations 
like Great Britain, France, our own, but even in China where inequalities 
have risen very much. This is a conflict that is as old as the world itself, but 
which nevertheless the technologies tend to accelerate and embitter. And then 
there are the conflicts that are, let us say, more intrinsically linked to the 
technologies. Many technologies meliorate life, allow one to work better, 
with less difficulty, many technologies entertain, they are intellectually 
stimulating, can serve as learning tools and so on. And then the difference 
that is introduced is that between those who can master these technologies, 
that give them a better life, and those who instead cannot make adequate use 
of them, either for economic reasons or for cultural reasons, perhaps also for 
political reasons. Let us not forget that in some states in the world the new 
technologies are subjected to censorship, limitations, police control and 
similar. Hence one of the major conflicts of the future will be between those 
who are full citizens, fully participating in the technological citadel, and those 
who instead have to camp outside its walls. 
 
The conflict between the owner of the robots (the new means of production) and the 
unemployed who have been expelled from the processes of production (the new proletariat) is 
a looming menace on the horizon. Already a rate of unemployment of 10-12% creates social 
tensions and generates crime. Imagine what could happen if it reached a much higher rate. 
Obviously, it cannot be excluded that the present technological change is generating only 
temporary problems, like all the previous technological changes in the last two centuries. All 
our preoccupations could be dissolved by the birth of new jobs that we cannot even imagine. 
But we cannot also exclude the possibility that we might have to face a completely novel 
situation.  The machines that will enter our society could be so intelligent that almost all 
human workers may soon become obsolete. We must also be prepared to face this scenario. 
If this happens, if this is happening, the best solution is not banning AI, but rather 
implementing social policies that would permit us to have all the benefits of robotisation and 
automation without the unwanted collateral effects of unemployment or increasing job 
precariousness. We must be ready to reactivate the policy of the gradual reduction of working 
hours and to introduce a citizen’s income. We must be psychologically prepared to reverse the 
dominant economic paradigm. To revitalise the economy, we might not need people working 
harder. We might need people working less. “Working less means work for all” – as a 
notorious slogan states. We might need more holidays, more free time, more welfare state, 
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more money to spend. These policies would certainly make human labour more expensive, 
but – contrary to what most economists think – this could be exactly what we need. The 
increase of the cost of labour makes “investments in automation increasingly attractive” 
(Hughes 2004), high-tech economies are more competitive than low-tech ones, more 
competitive economies can distribute better ‘social dividends’ to their citizens.  
This is hard to see, if we divide the world into Luddites (those that want to ban the machines) 
and anti-Luddites (those that label a Luddite whoever dares to relate technology to 
unemployment), tertium non datur. A third way actually exists: one may want more robots, 
more computers, more intelligent machines, more technologies, together with a consistent 
change in the system apt to guarantee a rational and fair redistribution of wealth. As 
sociologist James Hughes (2004) put it: “It’s time to make a choice: Luddism, barbarism or a 
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1
 By “degree of freedom” of an industrial robot, one means the number of axes of movement (in other 
words, the quantity of particular movements) that the machine is able to perform. The degree of 
freedom goes from 3-4 for the simplest robots to 9-10 degrees in the case of more complex ones. For 
comparison it is considered that the human hand has 23 degrees of freedom. 
2
 Fiat has installed its Robogate equipment in 1978. As New Scientist (12 June 1980, Vol. 86, No. 
1205, p. 247) reported, “each system comprises a series of robot ‘cells’, each of these containing two to 
four robots, which are arranged at intervals several metres along the line. The four basic parts to be 
welded are loaded onto a transporter, a low platform the size of a large tabletop. The transporter glides 
between the robot cells. Its motor is activated by signals passed along wires underneath the floor and 
detected by electromagnetic induction sensors. Movement of the transporter is controlled by a central 
computer.” Flexibility is the main feature of the system: “engineers can change the system’s 
parameters, while it is working on one model, to make a new design of car. To do this, engineers alter 
the software in both the robots and the central computer that controls the whole system; and make some 
changes to hardware, such as installing new gates for different car bodies. In less advanced robot 
installations, like those at Longbridge and and in many car factories in the US, operators do not have 
the benefit of this flexibility.” As a consequence, the Fiat “plant requires only two men to run it, 
compared with 100 in a plant in which the welding is done by hand.” New Scientist also reported that 
“Fiat has already sold one Robogate system to Chrysler in the US… General Motors is also interested 
in buying the system.” 
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3 Gallino makes the same observation: “In order to avoid reducing the working force and so to take too 
fast to the road of technological unemployment, one invented over a century ago the tools to reduce 
working hours. At one time, at the beginning of the [20
th
] century, one worked 3000 hours per year, in 
the middle of the century about 2500, and today most workers have a mean annual schedule of around 
1600-1700 hours of work. This is one of the advantages of technology, that of being able to keep 
people employed while decreasing their performance.” 
4
 This book has not been translated into English. The title means: If three million seems not much. On 
the ways to fight unemployment TN]. 
5 “A country that mostly buys a technology researched and developed by other, increases its 
productivity, and therefore sees the number of jobs decrease but it does not see them recreated by this 
technology” (Gallino 2008, 17). 
6
 The Eurostat 2009 report on science, technology and innovation in Europe is unforgiving and 
positions Italy among the last. In 2007, the 27 member states invested in a total of less than 229 billion 
euros, or 1,85% of the European GNP. At the same time, the USA reached 2,67% of GNP, and Japan 
(in 2006) 3,40% of GNP. In Europe, only Sweden and Finland spent more than 3% (3,60% and 3,47% 
respectively), then there are 4 countries (Denmark, Germany, France and Austria) that spent over 2%. 
Italy invests little: 1,09% in 2001 and 1,13% in 2006. But it is data relative to employment that 
interests us most and these data are very discouraging. According to this report researchers in the EU 
represent 0,9% of employment, while in Italy they reach 0,6%. See 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/9-08092009-AP/EN/9-08092009-AP-EN.PDF 
7 “Foreign residents in Italy on January 1st 2010 are 4.235.059, representing 7,0% of the total number 
of residents. On January 1
st
 2009 they represented 6,5%. During the year 2009 the number of foreigners 
grew by 343,764 units (+8,8%), a very high increase, but lower to that of the two preceding years 
(494,000 in 2007 and 459,000 in 2008, +16,8% and +13,4% respectively), chiefly as an effect of fewer 
arrivals from Romania.” (ISTAT 2010). 
8
 In 2010 in Italy there were over eleven thousand applications for bankruptcy – about thirty a day – 
representing an increase of 20% with respect to 2009 (Geroni 2011). 
